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1.	Introduction			Saul	Kripke	and	Nathan	Salmon	agree	that	Sherlock	Holmes	is	an	actually	existing	abstract	object	that	isn’t	an	actual	in-the-flesh	detective	(but	there	is	a	detective	according	to	the	fiction).	Kripke	and	Salmon	also	agree	that,	at	least	sometimes,	the	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	refers	to	that	fictional	character.	Kripke	thinks,	though,	that	sometimes,	when	we	use	‘Holmes’	to	pretend	to	refer	to	a	detective,	the	name	doesn’t	refer	to	anything	at	all,	whereas	Salmon	denies	that.	In	this	paper	I	will	look	at	two	forms	of	Salmon’s	argument	against	Kripke’s	view.	I	will	argue	that	Salmon’s	view	about	names	from	fiction	fares	no	better	in	the	face	of	Salmon’s	own	objections	to	Kripke’s	view.	Whether	or	not	Salmon’s	objections	work	against	Kripke’s	view,	the	objections	do	not	give	us	a	reason	to	prefer	Salmon’s	view	instead.	In	Section	2,	I	will	present	Kripke’s	ontology	of	fictional	characters,	on	which	fictional	characters	are	real,	abstract	entities.	In	Section	3,	I	will	present	Kripke’s	view	of	names	from	fiction	followed	by	a	discussion	of	how	Salmon	argues	against	Kripke’s	view.	In	Section	4,	I	will	present	Salmon’s	alternative	views	of	names	from	fiction.	I	will	then	argue	that	Salmon’s	views	are	subject	to	his	own	objection	against	Kripke’s	view	and	that,	as	a	result,	Salmon’s	views	are	not	preferable	to	Kripke’s.			
2.	Kripke	and	Salmon	on	Fictional	Characters			Kripke	argues	that	fictional	characters	exist	and	that	ordinary	language	quantifies	over	them.	In	saying	that	ordinary	language	quantifies	over	fictional	characters,	Kripke	is	arguing	for	the	existence	of	such	fictional	characters.	In	Lecture	V	of	
Reference	and	Existence:	The	John	Locke	Lectures,	Kripke	(2013:	80)	says,	“when	I	
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speak	of	the	ontology	of	fictional	characters	I	am	trying	to	give	a	report	on	the	ordinary	usage,	first,	of	certain	quantifications	that	we	can	make.”	Peter	van	Inwagen	(1977:	302)	uses	the	following	sentence	to	illustrate	how	we	use	language	to	talk	about	fictional	characters:	‘There	are	characters	in	some	18th-century	novels	who	are	presented	with	a	greater	wealth	of	physical	detail	than	is	any	character	in	any	18-th	century	novel.’		van	Inwagen	argues	that	sentences	like	his	“seem	to	assert	that	there	are	things	of	a	certain	sort:	if	anyone	were	to	utter	one	of	these	sentences	assertively,	it	would	seem	that	what	he	would	say	could	be	true	only	if	there	were	such	things	as	characters	in	novels.”1	Kripke	argues	that	these	kinds	of	sentences	are	“actually	true,	and	they	relate	people	to	a	kind	of	entity	whose	existence	is	actually	being	claimed	as	an	empirical	claim.”2	So	it’s	not	just	that	sentences	in	ordinary	language	quantify	over	fictional	characters;	it’s	also	that	these	sentences	are	true.	The	truth	of	‘There	are	fictional	characters’,	which	is	entailed	by	van	Inwagen’s	sentence,	requires	that	there	are	indeed	fictional	characters	that	exist	to	be	quantified	over.	If	some	sentence	quantifies	over	fictional	characters	and	that	sentence	is	true,	then	that	is	evidence	in	favor	of	the	claim	that	fictional	characters	exist.		 Kripke’s	view	is	that	fictional	characters	exist	because	works	of	fiction	about	them	have	been	written	or	stories	about	them	have	been	told.	In	Lecture	III	of	
Reference	and	Existence,	Kripke	(2013:	72)	says	that	Mark	Twain	brought	both	a	novel	and	a	character	into	existence	in	writing	Huckleberry	Finn.	Both	the	novel	and	the	character	exist;	the	existence	of	Huck	Finn	is	empirically	tied	to	the	existence	of																																																									1	van	Inwagen	1977:	302.	Italics	in	original.		2	Kripke	2013:	80.	Italics	in	original.		
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the	novel.	It	is	not	a	priori	that	the	fictional	character	Huck	Finn	exists;	empirical	evidence,	in	this	case	the	fact	that	Mark	Twain	wrote	the	novel,	is	needed	to	justify	the	existence	of	the	fictional	character.	So,	on	Kripke’s	view,	fictional	characters	exist	in	virtue	of	concrete	activities	like	writing	a	novel	or	telling	a	story.	In	Lecture	IV,	Kripke	(2013:	80)	says	that	“there	might	have	been,	of	course,	no	fictional	characters	at	all,	had	no	fictional	works	been	created”	and	concludes	that	fictional	characters	“exist	merely	in	virtue	of	the	activities	of	people.”		Kripke	(2013:	73)	says	that	“a	fictional	character,	then,	is	an	abstract	entity.”	Kripke	explains	that,	sometimes,	when	we	use	names	from	fiction,	like	‘Hamlet’,	we	use	the	names	“to	designate	abstract	but	quite	real	entities.”3	In	presenting	Kripke’s	view	of	fictional	characters	in	his	paper	“Nonexistence,”	Salmon	says	“that	wholly	fictional	characters	should	be	regarded	as	real	things.”	But,	although	a	fictional	character,	like	Sherlock	Holmes,	might	be	real,	fictional	characters	are	not	real	people.	Salmon	(1998:	293)	says	that,	for	Kripke,	fictional	characters	are	“neither	physical	objects	nor	mental	objects”	but	instead	are	abstract	entities.		In	Lecture	III,	Kripke	draws	an	analogy	between	fictional	characters	and	nations.	Kripke	(2013:	73)	says	that	a	fictional	character	is	an	abstract	entity	“which	exists	in	virtue	of	more	concrete	activities	the	same	way	that	a	nation	is	an	abstract	entity	which	exists	in	virtue	of	concrete	relations	between	people.”	On	Kripke’s	view,	nations	and	fictional	characters	are	not	tangible	things;	instead	they	are	abstract,	but	nonetheless	real,	entities.	Nations	and	fictional	characters	alike	exist	in	virtue	of	certain	human	actions.	Kripke	does	not	explicitly	say	how	or	when	nations																																																									3	Kripke	2013:	78.		
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come	into	existence,	but	on	his	view	a	claim	about	a	nation	“is	true	in	virtue	of,	and	solely	in	virtue	of,	the	activities	of	the	people.”4	Similarly,	a	claim	about	a	fictional	character	is	true	in	virtue	of	human	actions	like	“telling	stories,	writing	plays,	writing	novels,	and	so	on.”5	
	 In	Salmon’s	discussion	of	Kripke’s	views	about	the	ontology	of	fictional	characters,	it	is	clear	that	he	is	convinced	by	Kripke’s	conclusions.	For	example,	Salmon	(1998:	293)	begins	his	discussion	of	Kripke’s	view	with	the	introduction	“we	begin	with	a	plausible	theory	of	fiction.”			
3.	Kripke	on	Names	from	Fiction	
3.1.	Two	Uses		Kripke	says	that	there	can	be	empty	names	from	fiction.	In	this	case,	to	say	that	a	name	is	empty	is	to	say	that	the	name	does	not	refer	to	anything.	This	is	possible	because,	when	an	author	creates	a	character,	she	only	pretends	that	the	name	refers	to	something.	I	will	call	this	view	the	pretend	reference	view.		
The	pretend	reference	view:	Whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	she	uses	it,	and	when	we	use	it	that	way	we	pretend	that	the	name	refers	to	something.			For	example,	Sir	Arthur	Conan	Doyle,	in	creating	the	character	Sherlock	Holmes,	created	a	name	that	does	not	refer	on	Conan	Doyle’s	original	use	of	the	name	in	writing	the	Holmes	stories.	The	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’,	as	used	originally	by	Conan	Doyle,	was	not	intended	to	refer	to	anyone	in	the	real	world.	Using	a	different																																																									4	Kripke	2013:	73.		5	Kripke	2013:	73.		
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example,	Kripke	(2013:	81)	says,	“when	one	originally	introduces	the	term	‘Hamlet’,	there	is	merely	a	pretense	of	reference,	and	there	is	no	referent—period.”	Kripke	argues	that,	on	another	use	of	the	name,	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	does	indeed	have	a	referent:	namely	the	fictional	character	itself.	Kripke’s	view	is	that,	by	pretending	that	there	is	a	character	named	‘Sherlock	Holmes’,	Conan	Doyle	created	an	abstract	entity,	the	fictional	character	Sherlock	Holmes,	which	people	can	refer	to	outside	of	the	fiction.	Salmon,	in	“Nonexistence,”	discusses	Kripke’s	view	about	this	second	use	of	a	name	from	fiction.	Salmon	(1998:	294)	says,	“It	is	only	at	a	later	stage	when	discussing	the	fictional	character	from	a	standpoint	outside	of	the	fiction,	speaking	about	the	pretense	and	not	within	it”	that	our	language	makes	a	semantic	move	that	makes	the	name	a	name	for	the	fictional	character.	So,	according	to	Kripke,	this	use	of	the	name	of	a	fictional	character,	such	as	‘Sherlock	Holmes’,	from	the	standpoint	outside	of	the	fiction	is	distinct	from	the	original	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	on	which	it	operates	as	an	empty	name.				
3.2.	Kripke	on	Truth	in	Fiction			Kripke	says	that	the	sentence	‘Sherlock	Holmes	lived	on	Baker	Street’	is	true	because	it	has	the	implicit	operator	‘fictionally’	or	‘in	the	story’.	In	this	case,	the	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	would	be	used	in	the	manner	of	the	name	that	has	as	its	referent	the	fictional	character	Sherlock	Holmes	and	not	in	the	manner	of	the	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	that	has	no	referent.	Kripke	(2013:	74)	argues	that,	as	a	rule,	predicates	should	be	used	according	to	their	use	in	fiction	and	that	sentences	are	true	if	and	only	if	“a	fictional	character	is	so	described	in	the	appropriate	work	of	
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fiction.”	Using	the	implicit	operator	‘in	the	fiction’,	it	is	possible	to	utter	true	or	false	sentences	about	fictional	characters	as	long	as	what	is	said	is	true	or	false	as	described	in	the	work	itself.	So,	on	Kripke’s	view,	sentences	spoken	from	outside	the	fiction	about	the	fictional	character	Sherlock	Holmes	are	true	just	in	case	the	different,	but	corresponding,	sentences	originally	penned	by	Conan	Doyle	that	use	the	nonreferring	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	are	true.		The	sentence	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	is	true	(when	referring	to	the	fictional	character),	then,	because	Conan	Doyle	wrote	this	in	the	Holmes	stories.		
	
4.	Salmon’s	Objections	In	“Nonexistence,”	Salmon	considers	Kripke’s	ontology	of	fictional	characters	and	agrees	with	his	conclusions;	Kripke	and	Salmon	agree	about	the	ontology	of	fictional	characters,	but	not	about	the	semantics	of	names	from	fiction.6	Salmon’s	view	differs	from	Kripke’s	view	concerning	how	a	name	from	fiction,	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes’,	refers.	Salmon	introduces	terminology	to	help	express	Kripke’s	view	that	there	are	two	ways	in	which	we	use	names	from	fiction,	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes’.	Salmon	(1998:	294)	introduces	the	expression	‘Holmes1’	to	correspond	to	Conan	Doyle’s	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	in	creating	the	fiction,	a	use	that	“merely	pretends	to	name	someone	and	actually	names	nothing	at	all”;	and	he	introduces	the	expression	
																																																								6	In	1998,	when	Salmon	wrote	“Nonexistence,”	he	presented	Kripke’s	view	from	an	unpublished	form	of	The	John	Lock	Lectures,	which	Kripke	gave	in	1973.	Those	lectures	were	later	published	as	a	book,	Reference	and	Existence,	in	2013.	In	footnote	32	in	“Nonexistence,”	Salmon	cites	“The	John	Locke	Lectures	for	1973	(Oxford	University	Press,	unpublished)”	when	presenting	Kripke’s	views.			
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‘Holmes2’	to	correspond	to	the	nonpretend	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	as	a	name	that	refers	to	a	fictional	character.		Salmon	(1998:	294-295)	distinguishes	between	object-fictional	sentences	and	meta-fictional	sentences	in	describing	Kripke’s	“complex	account	of	sentences	from	fiction.”	Salmon	does	not	provide	an	explicit	definition	of	these	kinds	of	sentences,	but	he	provides	examples	to	characterize	them.	Sentences	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	are	object-fictional	sentences,	and	meta-fictional	sentences	are	sentences	like	‘According	to	the	stories,	Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’.	If	Kripke	is	right	and	a	name	from	fiction	has	two	uses,	those	corresponding	to	‘Holmes1’	and	‘Holmes2’,	and	a	sentence	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	can	be	read	as	prefixed	or	not	with	the	operator	‘according	to	the	story’	or	‘according	to	the	fiction’,	then	a	sentence	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	can	be	interpreted	in	four	different	ways:		(1) 				Holmes1	plays	the	violin.	(2) 				According	to	the	stories,	Holmes1	plays	the	violin.	(3) 				Holmes2	plays	the	violin.	(4) 				According	to	the	stories,	Holmes2	plays	the	violin.	Kripke	and	Salmon	agree	about	object-fictional	and	meta-fictional	sentences	in	which	the	name	‘Holmes2’	occurs;	it	is	only	when	it	comes	to	sentences	in	which	‘Holmes1’	occurs	that	Salmon’s	view	departs	from	Kripke’s.	Salmon	(1998:	295)	says	that	we	can	read	sentences	like	(3)	from	within	the	fiction,	in	which	case	the	sentence	would	be	saying	something	true	as	part	of	the	pretense.	This	case,	which	involves	‘Holmes2’,	is	a	case	where	Kripke	and	Salmon	draw	the	same	conclusions.	
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Salmon	(1998:295)	says	that	sentence	(3)	may	be	counted	as	true	if	it	correctly	reflects	what	is	true	within	the	fiction;	Salmon	(1998:	295)	says	this	is	due	to	Kripke’s	“extended	use	of	predicates,	on	which	‘plays	the	violin’	correctly	applies	to	an	abstract	entity	when	it	is	a	character	from	a	fiction	according	to	which	the	corresponding	fictional	person	plays	the	violin.”			Kripke	argues	that,	when	we	use	sentences	like	(1),	they	should	not	be	understood	as	expressing	propositions	that	are	false	in	the	real	world,	but	instead	should	be	understood	as	not	expressing	a	proposition	at	all.	Because	(1)	includes	the	name	‘Holmes1’,	which	has	no	referent,	the	sentence	itself	does	not	express	a	proposition.	Instead,	we	should	understand	sentences	like	(1)	to	be	using	the	name	of	a	pretend	man;	Kripke	(2013:	295)	argues	that	“using	the	sentence	[in	an	attempt]	to	make	a	statement	not	within	the	pretense	and	instead	about	the	real	world	outside	the	fiction,	the	sentence	expresses	nothing	and	is	therefore	not	literally	true.”	Another	view,	which	I	call	the	no	reference	view,	is	relevant	here	in	connection	with	Salmon’s	objections	to	Kripke’s	view.		
The	no	reference	view:	Whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	the	name	refers	to	something.		On	this	view,	there	is	no	name	‘Holmes1’	and	no	use	u	such	that,	when	we	use	‘Holmes1’	on	u,	‘Holmes1’	refers	to	a	man	or	anything	else.	It	seems	that	Kripke’s	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view.	On	the	pretend	reference	view	there	is	a	name	‘Holmes1’	and	a	use	u	such	that	when	Conan	Doyle	used	‘Holmes1’	on	
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use	u	we	pretend	that	‘Holmes1’	refers	to	a	man,	but	it	doesn’t	really.	So	we	can	say	that,	in	this	case,	there	is	no	use	u	of	‘Holmes1’	such	that	the	name	refers	to	a	man—which	just	is	the	no	reference	view	(provided	that	the	name	doesn’t	refer	to	anything	else,	either).	That	Kripke’s	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view	is	important	in	Salmon’s	objection,	because	Salmon	thinks	having	a	view	on	which	the	name	‘Holmes1’	has	no	reference	is	subject	to	criticism.		Salmon’s	view	departs	from	Kripke’s	because	Salmon	thinks	that	having	a	view	that	allows	there	to	be	sentences	in	which	no	proposition	is	expressed	is	problematic.	Salmon	(1998:	297)	says	that	“this	renders	the	meaningfulness	of	true-meta	fictional	sentences	like	‘According	to	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories,	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	problematic	and	mysterious.”	Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke’s	view	can	be	formulated	in	the	following	manner:		(P1)		 The	pretend	reference	view	is	true.	(Assumption	for	reductio.)	(P2)	 If	the	pretend	reference	view	is	true,	then	the	no	reference	view	is	true.		(C1)	 The	no	reference	view	is	true.		(From	(P1)	&	(P2).)	The	no	reference	view	says	that	whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	the	name	refers	to	something.	(P3)		 If	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	name	‘Holmes1’	has	a	referent,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.		(C2)		 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.	(From	(C1)	&	(P3).)	(P4)		 (1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	it	expresses	something.	
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(C3)	 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”	(From	(C2)	&	(P4).)	(P5)		 (2)	is	true	if	and	only	if	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”		(C4)	 (2)	isn’t	true.	(From	(C3)	&	(P5).)	(P6)		 Intuitively	(2)	is	true.			(C5)		 The	pretend	reference	view	is	false.	(From	(P1),	(C4)	&	(P6)	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.)			For	this	argument,	Salmon	assumes	that	Kripke’s	view	is	true	so	that	he	can	show	how	what	follows	from	the	view	cannot	turn	out	to	be	right.	As	I	mentioned,	the	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view;	on	the	no	reference	view	there	is	no	use	of	the	name	‘Holmes1’	on	which	the	view	refers	to	a	man	or	anything	else.	In	the	discussion	of	Kripke’s	view,	we	saw	that	(P3)	is	true;	Kripke	argues	that,	if	a	name	has	no	referent,	like	‘Holmes1’,	then	sentences	in	which	that	name	occurs	express	no	proposition.	(C2)	follows,	then,	because	the	nonreferring	name	‘Holmes1’	occurs	in	sentence	(1),	so	it	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.		Salmon	argues	that	(P4)	is	true;	sentences	are	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	they	express	something.	(C3)	follows;	(1)	does	not	express	a	proposition,	and	sentences	can	be	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	they	express	a	proposition,	so	it	is	no	the	case	that	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”	(P5)	is	true,	because	Salmon	argues	that	(2)	is	true	if	and	only	if	(1)	is	true	with	respect	to	the	fiction,	and	(1)	isn’t	true	with	respect	to	the	fiction,	so	(2)	isn’t	true.	But	(P6)	is	correct;	(2)	is	true.	It	is	obvious	that	(2)	is	true	and,	if	we	were	asked	to	mark	the	sentence	‘Holmes1	
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plays	the	violin’	true	or	false,	it	would	be	intuitively	true.	Salmon	concludes	that	Kripke’s	view	must	be	false,	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.		Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke	can	be	read	in	a	different	way,	too:		(P1)		 The	pretend	reference	view	is	true.	(Assumption	for	reductio.)	(P2)	 If	the	pretend	reference	view	is	true,	then	the	no	reference	view	is	true.	(C1)		 The	no	reference	view	is	true.		(From	(P1)	&	(P2).)	Whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	the	name	refers	to	something.	(P3)		 If	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	name	‘Holmes1’	has	a	referent,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	(2)	expresses	a	proposition.		(C2)		 No	proposition	is	expressed	by	(2).	(From	(C1)	&	(P3).)			(P4)		 If	it	is	not	the	case	that	(2)	expresses	a	proposition,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	it	is	either	true	or	false.			(C3)	 (2)	is	neither	true	nor	false.	(From	(C2)	&	(P4).)	(P5)		 Intuitively,	(2)	is	true.		(C4)		 The	pretend	reference	view	is	false.	(From	(P1),		(P3)	&	(P5)	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.)		The	difference	in	this	reading	of	Salmon’s	objection	is	that,	in	this	case,	sentence	(2)	itself	does	not	express	a	proposition	either.	Because	the	name	‘Holmes1’	occurs	in	(2),	(2)	doesn’t	express	a	proposition	itself,	and	so	is	neither	true	nor	false.	And,	
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again,	Salmon	argues	that	(2)	is	intuitively	true.	So,	on	either	reading,	Salmon	concludes	that	Kripke’s	view	is	false	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.			 Salmon’s	thinks	that,	intuitively,	sentence	(2)	is	true,	and	we	want	to	be	able	to	say	that	it	is	true.	But	we	can’t	do	this	if	Kripke	is	right	and	all	the	sentences	that	Conan	Doyle	wrote	that	contain	‘Holmes1’	do	not	express	any	propositions	at	all.	Salmon	objects	to	Kripke’s	view,	because	he	thinks	we	get	the	wrong	results	with	respect	to	sentences	(1)	and	(2).	A	feature	of	Salmon’s	objection	is	that	Kripke’s	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view,	which	Salmon	thinks	is	false.	(P2)	in	both	forms	of	his	objection	say	that	the	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view,	and	the	rest	of	the	argument	follows	from	this.	Salmon	(1998:	297-298)	sums	up	his	objection	to	Kripke’s	view	that	a	name	from	fiction	has	two	uses:	“if	object-fictional	sentences	like	‘Holmes1	plays	the	violin’	express	nothing	and	only	pretend	to	express	things,	how	can	they	be	true	with	respect	to	the	fiction,	and	how	can	meta-fictional	sentences	involving	object-fictional	subordinate	clauses	express	anything	at	all,	let	alone	something	true?”		
4.	Salmon	on	Names	from	Fiction	
4.1.	Two	Views	Salmon	(1998:	298)	says	that	“one	need	not	claim,	as	Kripke	does,	that	a	name	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	is	ambiguous”;	Salmon	thinks	that	there	is	no	good	reason	to	hold	onto	the	name	‘Holmes1’,	the	name	Conan	Doyle	originally	pretends	to	use	to	refer	to	a	man	within	the	fiction.	Salmon	(1998:	298)	says,		
	 14	
Why	hold	onto	an	alleged	use	of	[the	names	of	fictional	characters]	that	fails	to	refer	to	them?	It	is	like	buying	a	luxurious	sports	car	only	to	keep	it	garaged.		His	analogy,	though	a	little	odd,	highlights	Salmon’s	most	basic	rejection	of	Kripke’s	view—why	even	hold	the	view	that	there	is	a	name	that	does	not	refer	to	anything	or	anyone?	If	there	are	fictional	characters,	we	should	be	able	to	refer	to	them	using	their	names	as	written	in	the	fiction,	just	as	a	nice	car	should	be	driven.			 	Salmon	begins	to	develop	his	alternative	view	of	how	names	from	fiction,	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes’,	refer.	Salmon	(1998:	299)	says	that,	“even	if	one	regards	a	name	as	something	that	exists	independently	of	its	introduction	into	language	(as	is	my	inclination),	it	is	a	confusion	to	think	of	a	name	as	referring,	or	not	referring,	other	than	as	doing	so	on	as	particular	use.”7	In	this	part	of	his	paper,	however,	there	are	two	separate	views	that	Salmon	might	be	understood	as	holding,	and	it	is	unclear	which	of	these	two	views	Salmon	ultimately	holds.	In	neither	view	that	Salmon	introduces	does	the	name	‘Holmes1’	refer.	The	first	view	I	will	call	the	
pretend	use	view.	
The	pretend	use	view:	Whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	we	pretend	that	there	is	a	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	the	name	refers	to	something.	(On	this	view,	we	pretend	that	there	is	a	use	of	the	name	on	which	the	name	refers	to	something	but	there	is	not	really	a	use	of	the	name	on	which	the	name	refers	to	anything.)	
																																																								7	Italics	in	original.		
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On	this	view,	there	is	the	name	‘Holmes1’,	and	we	pretend	that	there	is	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	the	name	in	that	way	it	refers	to	a	man.	I	will	call	the	second	view	
the	pretend	name	view.		
The	pretend	name	view:	Whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	the	author	is	only	pretending	that	there	is	a	name,	n,	and	a	use,	u,	such	that	when	the	author	uses	n	on	u	it	refers	to	something.	(On	this	view,	the	author	is	pretending	that	there	is	a	name	and	a	use	on	which	the	name	refers	to	something,	but	there	is	not	really	a	name	or	a	use	of	the	name	on	which	the	name	refers	to	something.)			On	this	view,	Conan	Doyle	pretended	there	is	the	name	‘Holmes1’	and	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	‘Holmes1’,	it	refers	to	a	man,	but	there	isn’t	really	the	name	‘Holmes1’	or	a	use	of	the	name.		There	is	evidence	that	Salmon	holds	the	pretend	use	view.	Salmon	(1998:	299)	says	that,	“The	alleged	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	on	which	it	is	thoroughly	nonreferring	was	supposed	to	be	a	pretend	use,	not	a	real	one.”	Salmon	thinks	that	Conan	Doyle	originally	did	not	use	the	name	‘Holmes1’	because	he	only	pretended	to.	Salmon	(1998:	299)	says	that,	although	Conan	Doyle	“wrote	the	name	down	as	part	of	sentences	in	the	course	of	writing	the	Holmes	stories,”	it	was	a	pretend	use	as	part	of	the	pretense	of	the	story,	and	he	never	actually	used	it.	Salmon	(1998:	299)	compares	Conan	Doyle’s	use	of	‘Holmes1’	to	the	use	actors	make	of	their	lines	during	a	performance;	he	says	“it	is	not	a	use	whereby	the	one	speaking	commits	him/herself	to	the	propositions	expressed.”		
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Salmon	(1998:	299)	argues	that,	as	Conan	Doyle	wrote	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories,	he	created	the	fictional	character	Sherlock	Holmes,	which	plays	a	role	in	the	stories.	Salmon	says	that,		The	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	was	originally	coined	by	Conan	Doyle	in	writing	the	story	(and	subsequently	understood	by	readers	reading	the	Holmes	stories)	as	the	fictional	name	for	the	protagonist.	That	thing—in	fact	merely	an	abstract	artifact—is	according	to	the	story,	a	man	by	the	name	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’.8		So,	in	this	case,	there	is	a	fictional	character.	The	fictional	character	is	not	a	man,	but	according	to	the	fiction	it	is.	There	is	a	name	that	does	not	refer	to	a	man,	given	how	Conan	Doyle	originally	only	pretended	to	use	it,	but	according	to	the	fiction	it	does.		On	the	pretend	use	view,	“the	alleged	thoroughly	nonreferring	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	by	Conan	Doyle,	as	a	pretend	name	for	a	man,	is	a	myth”	and	this	mythical	use	of	the	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	that	corresponds	to	‘Holmes1’	is	“an	allegedly	thoroughly	nonreferring	use	that	pretends	to	name	a	brilliant	detective	who	performed	such-and-such	exploits.”9		But,	Salmon	(1998:	300)	says,	there	is	no	literal	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	that	corresponds	to	‘Holmes1’.	His	view	gets	complicated,	here.	Salmon	(1998:	300)	explains,	At	a	later	stage,	use	of	the	name	is	imported	from	the	fiction	into	reality,	to	name	the	very	same	thing	that	it	is	the	name	of	according	to	the	story.	That	thing—now	the	real	as	well	as	the	fictional	bearer	of	the	name—is	according	to	the	story	a	human	being	who	is	a	brilliant	detective,	and	in	reality	an	artifactual	abstract	entity	created	by	Conan	Doyle.			So	the	name	‘Holmes1’,	which	Kripke	holds	to	be	a	nonreferring	name	that	Conan	Doyle	pretends	to	use	to	name	a	man,	has	no	real	use,	and	only	the	name	‘Holmes2’																																																									8	Italics	in	original.		9	Salmon	1998:	300.	
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corresponds	to	the	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’.	Although	the	name	‘Holmes2’	is	originally	not	used	at	all—because,	although	according	to	the	fiction	it	has	a	use,	it	does	not	really	have	a	use,	outside	the	fiction—later,	from	the	standpoint	outside	the	fiction,	it	has	a	real	use	on	which	it	refers	to	the	abstract	fictional	character	Sherlock	Holmes.			 But	there	is	another	way	to	read	Salmon’s	view	about	names	from	fiction.	In	his	discussion	of	the	pretend	use	view,	Salmon	sometimes	seems	to	be	endorsing	the	pretend	use	view	only	to	segue	into	the	pretend	name	view.	Salmon	(1998:	299)	says	that	“the	pretend	use	of	the	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	by	Conan	Doyle	does	not	have	to	be	regarded	as	generating	a	use	of	the	name	on	which	it	is	nonreferring.”	As	we	saw	before,	for	Salmon,	a	name	refers	to	something	or	someone	only	on	a	particular	use.	But,	in	this	case,	no	name	was	genuinely	introduced.	If	there	is	no	genuine	use	of	‘Holmes1’,	and	a	name	only	refers	on	a	use,	then	there	is	no	name	‘Holmes1’	that	refers.	It	is	here	that	Salmon	suggests	the	pretend	name	view;	Salmon	(1998:	299)	says	that,	“one	might	go	so	far	as	to	say	that	a	pretend	use	by	itself	does	not	even	give	rise	to	a	real	name	at	all,	any	more	than	it	gives	birth	to	a	real	detective.”	So,	if	the	name	‘Holmes1’	does	not	really	have	a	use,	and	there	is	not	really	a	name	‘Holmes1’,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	name	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	refers—because	there	is	no	name	to	do	the	referring.			It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	Salmon	draws	the	same	conclusions	when	he	considers	the	pretend	name	view	as	he	does	with	the	pretend	use	view.	In	neither	case	is	there	a	name	and	a	use;	on	one	there	is	a	name,	but	no	use,	so	the	name	does	not	refer	on	any	use,	and	on	the	other	there	is	no	name,	and	no	use,	so	it	
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is	not	the	case	that	there	is	a	name	that	refers	on	any	use.	If,	with	this	notation	of	‘Holmes1’	and	‘Holmes2’,	the	subscripts	are	supposed	to	correspond	to	a	use,	and	with	both	the	pretend	use	view	and	the	pretend	name	view	there	is	no	genuine	use	of	the	name	‘Holmes1’,	then	there	is	no	‘Holmes1’,	since	there	is	no	genuine	use	for	the	subscript	to	correspond	to.		Salmon	puts	forward	his	views	as	an	alternative	to	Kripke’s,	and	in	considering	either	of	the	views	he	presents,	Salmon	eliminates	the	possibility	that	there	is	a	nonreferring	name,	‘Holmes1’,	in	the	way	that	Kripke	posits.	Salmon	draws	the	conclusion	that	the	expression	‘Sherlock	Holmes’,	which	corresponds	to	‘Holmes2’,	is	later	imported	out	of	the	fiction	and	turned	into	a	name	when	a	use	is	bestowed	upon	it;	the	name	on	that	use	refers	to	the	fictional	character.		Before	getting	back	to	object-fictional	and	meta-fictional	sentences,	it	is	important	to	mention	what	Salmon	has	to	say	about	propositions.	On	Salmon’s	(1998:	301)	view,	“Conan	Doyle’s	sentences	involving	[‘Sherlock	Holmes’]	express	singular	propositions	about	his	character”	that	he	was	originally	only	pretending	to	assert.	Salmon	(1998:	301)	says	that	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories	could	be	understood	as	a	sequence	of	propositions;	he	says	that	Conan	Doyle	only	pretended	to	assert	these	propositions	and	“in	doing	so,	Conan	Doyle	pretended	(and	his	readers	pretend)	that	the	propositions	are	true	propositions	about	a	real	man.”	Salmon	(1998:	301)	sums	up	his	view	well	when	says	that,		To	assert	a	proposition,	in	this	sense,	is	in	part	to	commit	oneself	to	its	truth;	so	to	pretend	to	assert	a	proposition	is	to	pretend	to	commit	oneself	to	its	truth.	And	the	propositions	in	question	entail	that	Holmes	was	not	an	abstract	entity	but	a	flesh-and-blood	detective.	Taken	literally,	they	are	untrue.		
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Salmon	(1998:	302)	thinks	that	“it	is	of	the	very	essence	of	a	fictional	character	to	be	depicted	in	the	fiction	as	the	person	who	takes	part	in	such-and-such	events,	performs	such-and-such	actions,	thinks	such-and	such	thoughts”;	a	fictional	character	gets	its	essence	from	propositions	that	people	pretend	to	assert	and	believe.	It	might	be	strange	to	think	of	a	fictional	character	as	getting	its	essence	from	propositions,	but	it	seems	that’s	what	Salmon’s	view	comes	down	to,	since	for	an	entity	x	to	be	depicted	as	having	a	property	F	in	the	fiction	is	for	the	proposition	that	x	is	F	to	be	in	the	set	of	propositions	that	is	the	fiction.		Salmon	(1998:	302),	in	an	effort	to	explain	why	his	view	is	to	be	preferred	over	Kripke’s,	says	that	his	analysis	“yields	a	straightforward	account—what	I	believe	is	the	correct	account—of	the	meaningfulness	and	apparent	truth	of	object-fictional	sentences	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’,	and	thereby	also	of	the	meaning	and	truth	of	meta-fictional	sentences	like	‘According	to	the	Holmes	stories,	Holmes	plays	the	violin’.”10	So	Salmon	thinks	his	account	of	names	from	fiction	is	the	correct	account,	and	this	is	because,	as	Salmon	argues,	his	account	yields	better	results	than	Kripke’s	when	considering	the	truth	of	object-fictional	sentences	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	and	also	the	truth	of	meta-fictional	sentences	like	‘According	to	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories,	Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’.	Salmon	does	not	make	it	clear	here	whether	he	is	talking	here	about	‘Holmes1’	or	‘Holmes2’,	but	since	his	objection	to	Kripke’s	view	pertains	only	to	sentences	(1)	and	(2),	which	contain	the	name	‘Holmes1’,	I	think	we	are	supposed	to	assume	he	is	talking	here	
																																																								10	Italics	in	original.		
	 20	
about	sentences	(1)	and	(2).11	Salmon	has	a	technical	view	about	why,	on	his	account,	object-fictional	sentences	are	true:	The	object-fictional	sentence	is	not	true	with	respect	to	the	real	world,	since	abstract	entities	make	terrible	musicians.	But	it	is	true	with	respect	to	the	fiction—or	true	“in	the	world	of	the	fiction”—by	virtue	of	being	entailed	by	the	propositions,	themselves	about	fictional	characters,	that	comprise	the	fiction,	taken	together	with	supplementary	propositions	concerning	such	things	as	the	ordinary	physical-causal	structure	of	the	world,	usual	social	customs,	etc.,	that	are	assumed	as	the	background	against	which	the	fiction	unfolds.		On	Salmon’s	view,	Conan	Doyle,	in	writing	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories,	pretended	to	assert	the	proposition	that	Holmes	plays	the	violin.	Because	he	did	this	in	the	course	of	his	writing,	we	can	say	that	it	is	true,	with	respect	to	the	fiction,	that	the	fictional	character	Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin.	Moreover,	a	meta-fictional	sentence	like	“‘According	to	the	fiction,	f,	ϕ’	is	true	with	respect	to	the	real	world	if	and	only	if	ϕ	is	true	with	respect	to	the	mentioned	fiction.”12	Salmon	(1998:	304)	concludes	that,	since	his	view	gets	the	right	results	when	considering	the	truth-value	of	sentences	like	(1)	and	(2),	which	he	argues	Kripke’s	view	gets	wrong,	his	account	of	names	from	fiction	is	preferable.		
	
4.2.	An	Objection		Salmon	puts	forth	two	views	and	concludes	that	they	result	in	a	better	picture	of	names	from	fiction	than	does	Kripke’s	view.	I	argue,	however,	that	Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke’s	view	can	be	applied	to	Salmon’s	view	directly,	with	minimal	change,	to	show	that	Salmon’s	views	are	no	better	in	the	face	of	his	own	objection.																																																									11	I	will	return	to	this	question	later	in	in	my	discussion	of	my	objections	to	Salmon.	12	Salmon	1998:	303.	
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Recall	that	any	sentence	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	can	be	interpreted	in	four	different	ways:		(1) 				Holmes1	plays	the	violin.	(2) 				According	to	the	stories,	Holmes1	plays	the	violin.	(3) 				Holmes2	plays	the	violin.	(4) 				According	to	the	stories,	Holmes2	plays	the	violin.	A	key	feature	of	Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke’s	view	is	that	Kripke’s	view	entails	the	no	reference	view.	It	turns	out,	though,	that	Salmon’s	views	both	entail	the	no	reference	view	as	well.		On	the	no	reference	view,	whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	n	refers	to	something.	On	the	pretend	use	view,	there	is	a	name	‘Holmes1’	but	we	only	pretend	that	there	is	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	the	name	in	that	way	it	refers	to	a	man.	On	the	pretend	name	view	the	author	pretends	there	is	a	name	and	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	the	name	in	that	way	it	refers	to	a	man.	In	neither	case	is	there	a	use	of	the	name	‘Holmes1’	on	which	it	refers	to	something,	so	both	views	entail	the	no	reference	view.	This	is	a	problem	for	Salmon.	Here	is	how	Salmon’s	argument	against	Kripke’s	view	can	be	used	against	Salmon’s	own	views:				(P1*)	 Either	the	pretend	use	view	or	the	pretend	name	view	is	true.	(Assumption	for	reductio.)	(P2*)	 If	either	the	pretend	use	view	or	the	pretend	name	view	is	true,	then	the	no	reference	view	is	true.		(C1)	 The	no	reference	view	is	true.	(From	(P1*)	&	(P2*).)	The	no	reference	view	says	that	whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	
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like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	the	name	refers	to	something.	(P3)		 If	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	name	‘Holmes1’	has	a	referent,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.		(C2)		 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.	(From	(C1)	&	(P3).)	(P4)		 (1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	it	expresses	something.	(C3)	 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”	(From	(C2)	&	(P4).)	(P5)		 	(2)	is	true	if	and	only	if	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”		(C4)	 	(2)	isn’t	true.	(From	(C3)	&	(P5).)	(P6)		 Intuitively,	(2)	is	true.			(C5*)	 The	pretend	reference	view	and	the	pretend	name	view	are	false.		(From	(P1*),	(C4)	&	(P6)	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.)			As	earlier	mentioned,	that	Salmon	thinks	Kripke’s	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view	is	part	of	Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke.	Since	Conan	Doyle	only	used	the	name	‘Holmes1’	to	pretend	to	refer	to	a	man,	Salmon	is	able	to	argue	against	the	pretend	reference	view.	If	this	undermines	the	pretend	reference	view,	then	the	pretend	use	view	and	the	pretend	name	view	are	likewise	undermined.	So,	Salmon’s	view	likewise	entails	the	no	reference	view	and	can	then	be	argued	against.			 (P1*)	says	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	on	either	of	Salmon’s	views	‘Holmes1’	refers.	If	on	neither	view	there	is	a	referent	for	the	name			‘Holmes1’,	then	both	views	entail	the	no	reference	view;	it	is	not	the	case	(on	
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either	view)	that	there	is	a	name,	‘Holmes1’,	and	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	‘Holmes1’	on	that	use	it	refers	to	the	man	and	detective	Sherlock	Holmes,	or	to	anything	else.	If	(P1*)	is	right,	then	the	rest	of	Salmon’s	own	argument	follows	and	we	can	conclude	that	there	is	no	reason	to	prefer	Salmon’s	view	over	Kripke’s	in	the	face	of	this	argument.			 Salmon	might	argue	that	the	pretend	use	view	and	the	pretend	name	actually	do	not	entail	the	no	reference	view.	Salmon	thinks	that	he	gets	around	the	problem	he	has	with	Kripke’s	view,	which	is	that	sentences	with	the	name	‘Holmes1’	do	not	express	propositions.	Salmon	thinks	that	there	is	never	any	genuine	use	of	‘Holmes1’	and	that	it	doesn’t	matter	if	the	name	doesn’t	refer,	because	it	is	only	the	fictional	character—whose	only	legitimate	name	‘Holmes2’—that	we	should	worry	about.	Salmon	says	that	Conan	Doyle	spun	an	elaborate	pretense	in	creating	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories	by	pretending	to	assert	propositions.	He	argues	that	Conan	Doyle	only	pretended	to	assert	propositions	and	that	at	a	later	time	the	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	is	imported	into	reality	to	refer	to	the	fictional	character	Holmes,	whose	essence	is	based	off	of	propositions	Conan	Doyle	originally	only	pretended	to	assert.				But,	Conan	Doyle	originally	only	pretended	to	assert	propositions	in	writing	the	sentences	that	make	up	the	Holmes	stories,	then	the	sentences	do	not	express	propositions	with	respect	to	the	fiction;	these	sentences	were	never	asserted	in	a	non-pretend	way	and	therefore	do	not	have	any	legitimate	truth	value.	Salmon	thinks	that	the	essence	of	the	fictional	
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character,	Holmes,	comes	from	the	propositions	Conan	Doyle	originally	pretended	to	assert.	If	Conan	Doyle	only	pretended	to	assert	propositions	on	which	the	essence	of	the	fictional	character	is	based,	he	too	didn’t	really	assert	a	proposition.	And,	to	use	Salmon’s	own	argument	against	his	view,	if	no	proposition	is	expressed	by	(1),	then	it	is	neither	true	nor	false.		And,	if	(1)	is	neither	true	nor	false,	then	(2)	isn’t	either,	since	what	is	true	“according	to	the	fiction”	is	based	off	of	what	Conan	Doyle	pretended	to	assert	about	Holmes	(and	how	can	you	base	something	true	off	of	a	sentence	that	expresses	nothing?).	Salmon’s	view	is	no	better	than	Kripke’s,	then,	in	these	respects.			 I	have	one	last	consideration	in	objecting	to	Salmon’s	view	about	names	from	fiction.		Salmon	argues	that	his	account	of	names	from	fiction	is	better,	because	it	results	in	better	conclusions	when	considering	the	truth	of	object-fictional	and	meta-fictional	sentences.	This	is	a	bit	misleading,	though,	because	Salmon	never	explicitly	says	whether	he	is	talking	about	‘Holmes1’	or	‘Holmes2’	in	the	passage	where	he	states	this.	In	order	for	Salmon’s	account	to	be	preferable	over	Kripke’s,	it	needs	to	yield	the	results	mentioned	above,	but	about	‘Holmes1’,	not	about	‘Holmes2’.	It	seems	here,	though,	that	Salmon	is	talking	about	‘Holmes2’,	because	he	says,	as	previously	mentioned,	that,	“in	all	our	genuine	discourse	about	Holmes,	we	use	the	name	in	the	‘Holmes2’	way.”13		This	is	a	problem	for	Salmon.	If	Salmon	thinks	he	is	sidestepping	the	problem	by	saying	the	name	‘Holmes1’	(if	he	thinks	it’s																																																									13	Salmon	1998:	303.		
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even	a	name)	is	not	genuinely	ever	used	and	therefore	we	should	only	talk	about	‘Holmes2’,	then	he	isn’t	solving	the	problem	at	all.		 																				
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